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Abstract
Legal pluralist law reform engages citizens in dialogue through which they gain richer insight into their
normative lives and learn to manage everyday interactions with each other. Noting that first- and second-
generation law reform commissions have been critiqued for their narrow vision and goal of modifying
individual legal rules, this article shifts the focus to the general public as a key player in the enterprise. This is
how law reform responds to public concerns and engages the public’s assumptions about the reform process.
The true ambition of law reform is to find opportunities for Canadians to examine their assumptions about
what they ask of their law, engage in dialogues about where and why their expectations of law might be
unrealistic, and involve them in the hard work of building more just official and unofficial legal
systems—wherever and by whatever means it is actually carried out.
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LAW REFORM FOR DUMMIES 
(3RD EDITION)
RODERICK A MACDONALD*
* FR Scott Professor of Constitutional and Public Law, McGill University. This essay was 
originally delivered as the lunchtime keynote address at the Symposium honouring John 
McCamus held at Osgoode Hall Law School on February 7, 2013. I wish to thank the 
organizers of that celebration of John McCamus’ work for giving me the opportunity to 
reflect on the scholarly paths we have walked together in pursuit of law reform. As far as 
possible, I have attempted to retain the conversational style of the conference presentation, 
relegating collateral arguments and qualifications to discursive footnotes. Harry Arthurs, 
Blaine Baker, and Nathalie Des Rosiers kindly offered comments on an earlier version of this 
essay.
** During the editing process we learned, sadly, of Professor Roderick Macdonald’s death. 
Professor Macdonald had strong bonds with the Osgoode community and in 2011 was 
awarded an honorary doctorate by York University; in lieu of a speech to the graduating 
class, he strummed his guitar and sang to an enthralled audience. In February 2013 and 
with his illness gaining on him, Professor Macdonald made the difficult trip from Montreal 
to Toronto by car, braving snowstorms to take his place at the symposium to honour John 
McCamus. He delivered the symposium’s keynote address with help from his longtime 
friend, Professor Emeritus Harry Arthurs, who read parts of the text for him. Professor 
Macdonald’s heart and selflessness in participating fully at the symposium were inspiring and 
unforgettable. Despite his worsening illness, Professor Macdonald revised his paper after the 
symposium and responded to our requests with alacrity and good cheer. Regrettably, he did 
not see the proofs of this article and any errors or omissions are ours, not his. — The Editors
Legal pluralist law reform engages citizens in dialogue through which they gain richer 
insight into their normative lives and learn to manage everyday interactions with each other. 
their narrow vision and goal of modifying individual legal rules, this article shifts the focus 
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I. A PERSONAL PROLOGUE
I HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENT in this essay. 
I am meant to honour John McCamus, to say something new and intelligent 
about law reform, and to do both in a manner that captures the humour and 
wit for which John is rightly celebrated. So there can be no illusions, let me 
begin by confessing my inadequacy to the task at hand. Indeed, there is 
something paradoxical in the fact that I should be thought to be an appropriate 
commentator on John’s contributions to law reform. As a law reformer I stand 
in his shadow; whatever themes I develop in this essay others no doubt will see 
as mere extrapolations from his work. There are three specific reasons for my 
modesty in offering this tribute, which I rehearse as prologue to the substantive 
theses presented here.
ou les moyens utilisés pour y parvenir.
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First of all, John has a capacious understanding of law reform that humbles 
those who have worked with him. It is hard to think of a single contribution 
that he has made to the law that does not constitute, in multiple dimensions, an 
exercise of law reform. Consider the following achievements.
At the top of the list, of course, are his many and diverse involvements over 
more than a quarter of a century with the Ontario Law Reform Commission 
(OLRC)—as researcher, project director, Commissioner, and ultimately as Chair.1
Then comes John’s path-breaking doctrinal work in the law of restitution 
and contracts. Those essays and monographs are no mere restatement of the latest 
judicial decisions dressed up in the elegant prose that makes us all envious. For 
over thirty years, his writing has served to uncover basic themes, to point out and 
resolve normative incoherencies and, thereby, to move the law forward.2
Reflect next on his magnificent shepherding of commissions and Task Forces 
devoted to complex dossiers in the realms of freedom of information and privacy 
and of access to justice, including the civil justice review and the legal aid regime. 
The Reports, either written by him or issued over his signature, invariably served 
to reframe the manner in which policy-makers, politicians, and the public have 
come to perceive those subjects.3
John’s yeoman service on the Board of the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association (CCLA) reveals how committed citizen engagement with the 
legislative and administrative processes can be a powerful engine of law reform.4 
Strategic deployment of the everyday tools of legal practice—writing briefs, 
giving speeches, issuing policy papers, building broad interest-group consensuses 
and litigating—can make a substantial contribution to improving the law, 
incrementally but inexorably.
1. From 1972–1979 he was a member of the Research Team for the OLRC Sale of Goods 
Project, and from 1980–1985 he was a Member of the Contract Law Amendment Project 
of the Commission. He was appointed as a Commissioner in 1990 and served as Chair 
from 1993 through 1996 when funding for the OLRC was terminated by the Ontario 
government.
2. For notable examples of John’s rich doctrinal writing, see John D McCamus & Peter D 
Maddaugh, The Law of Restitution, 2d ed (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2004); John D 
McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012).
3. Three significant instances of this type of policy work are his service as Research Director of 
the Ontario Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual Privacy (1977–1980), 
as Chair of the Fundamental Issues Group of the Ontario Civil Justice Review (established 
by The Ontario Court of Justice and the Ministry of The Attorney General of Ontario) 
(1994–1996), and as Chair of the Ontario Legal Aid Review (1996–1997).
4. John joined the Board of Directors of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association in 1986 and 
has served as Chair of the Board since 1992.
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Moreover, during John’s stewardship of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
as Editor-in-Chief he raised the bar for academic legal writing beyond mere 
reportage. He accepted the challenge of the Law and Learning report5 to embrace 
empirical research, critical theory, and policy studies, all of which aimed at 
changing the manner in which law is analyzed and assessed.6
Complementing John’s multiple activities on the domestic front has been his 
service to the cause of international law reform, since 1998 as a member of the 
Advisory Committee for the Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 
Third7 and since 2007, as a full member of the American Law Institute (ALI).
Finally, John’s decades as a stimulating teacher and graduate supervisor, 
during which time he piqued the curiosity of his students and colleagues and 
provided them not just with the tools to recognize defects in the law but also with 
the desire to act—through the development of contract precedents, negotiation, 
lobbying and litigation—to remedy inadequacies and injustice in the law.8
That is a daunting record. It is clearly beyond my capacity to capture fully 
the enormous impact that John’s activities in each of those dimensions have had 
on law reform in Canada and internationally. To do so would require nothing less 
than a bevy of authors addressing a bevy of topics, methodologies, and processes. 
At best I can point to common themes in his oeuvré and show how others have 
carried forward law reform methodologies and approaches that he pioneered.
5. Law and Learning, Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada by the Consultative Group on Education in Law (Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council, Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, 1983) (Chair, HW Arthurs).
6. As Editor-in-Chief between 1989 and 1996, he was responsible for positioning the journal 
as one of the leading forums for progressive legal scholarship in Canada. In addition, the 
journal published three outstanding symposia during his editorial tenure: “Impact of the 
Charter on the Public Policy Process: A Symposium” (1992) 30:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 499-652; 
“Symposium Towards the 21st Century: Canadian/Australian Legal Perspectives” (1993) 
31:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 1-471; “Symposium: Michael J Trebilcock’s the Limits of Freedom of 
Contract” (1995) 33:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 209-352.
7. Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Third (2 vols) (2011).  John is one of a 
very few non-Americans to serve on American Law Institute (ALI) advisory panels, let alone 
achieve election as full members as he did in 2007. The law reform methodology of the ALI 
as a private legislature is significantly different than that found in governmental law reform 
agencies in Canada. It would be interesting to assess the extent to which his recent US 
experience has influenced his views of and approach to law reform over the past five years.
8. John’s teaching was informed by consulting work in his fields of interest, for government (for 
example, as Chair of Legal Aid Ontario since 2007), for Non-Governmental Organizations, 
and for the private sector legal practice (since 2000 he has been an Associated Scholar with 
Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP).
MACDONALD, LAW REFORM FOR DUMMIES 863
There is a second reason that my effort in this essay to celebrate John’s 
career as law reformer sounds in paradox. Anyone familiar with our respective 
contributions to one kind of law reform—that reflected in consultation 
documents, studies and reports emanating from an official state agency charged 
with examining the current state of the law and making recommendations for its 
modification or repeal—would know my debt to him.
The three years that I served as President of the reconstituted Law Commission 
of Canada (LCC) (1997–2000) immediately followed John’s tenure as Chair of 
the OLRC (1993–96). Although I had thrice contributed to OLRC projects in 
the 1980s and early-1990s, my real apprenticeship in institutional law reform 
came when I had the good fortune to participate in a major undertaking of the 
OLRC during John’s period of leadership.9 Not surprisingly, much of what was 
accomplished by the federal law reform agency while I was President could be 
recast as the continuing pursuit of themes, ideas, approaches, and processes that 
had been uncovered, promoted, or honed by John.10
A third paradox in my celebration of John’s contributions to law reform 
has a more personal dimension. Ten years ago, I authored a short book entitled 
Lessons of Everyday Law,11 which was a revised collection of President’s Messages 
published on the website of the LCC from 1998–2000. One of the most popular 
of those Messages was a story comparing the travails of maintaining the dock at a 
summer cottage against the ravages of winter ice floes to the business of proposing 
reforms to legal rules that seemed constantly to bump up against countervailing 
9. In 1995, I was invited to participate in the work of the Ontario Civil Justice Review. The 
Fundamental Issues Group of the Review, in collaboration with the OLRC, commissioned 
me to write an essay on various dimensions of access to civil justice. This paper was ultimately 
published as Roderick A Macdonald, “Prospects for Civil Justice,” in the Ontario Law 
Reform Commission Study Paper on Prospects for Civil Justice (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, 1996) at 1.
10. A close reading of the 1998 Strategic Agenda of the LCC in conjunction with the OLRC 
Final Report will reveal the extent of John’s impact on how the federal commission came to 
understand its mandate. The connections between the two commissions ran deep, involving 
both ideas and personnel. For example, the first Vice-President and second President of 
the Law Commission of Canada was Professor Nathalie Des Rosiers, who was serving as a 
Commissioner of the Ontario Law Reform Commission under John’s leadership when the 
OLRC was defunded in 1996. See Law Commission of Canada, Strategic Agenda (Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada, 1998) [LCC, Strategic Agenda 1998]; Ontario Law Reform 
Commission [LCC, Strategic Agenda 1998]; Ontario Law Reform Commission, Final Report 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1996) [OLRC, Final Report].
11. Roderick A Macdonald, Lessons of Everyday Law (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 
2002) [Macdonald, Lessons of Everyday Law].
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social practices and behaviours. That little essay was entitled “Sometimes it’s 
better just to fix the dock …”12
What, until now, only John and I know is that I got the idea and the 
metaphor directly from him. In an informal setting a few years earlier he was 
patiently explaining to a group of younger law professors the opportunities and 
constraints on law reform by reference to a quotidian issue of home ownership 
about which he had recently been puzzling. When should you be content simply 
to fix a dilapidated part of a driveway? And when should you do more, perhaps 
even going whole hog—resurface the entire driveway, rebuild the garage, change 
the side door of the house to give better access, fix the roof and eavestroughs 
so that storm water was not constantly hollowing out the ground under the 
driveway, and so on? My own little story was a pale reflection of the richness 
of John’s original anecdote. In John’s version, the tale was not simply about the 
goals (or ends) of law reform; he also drew out the richness of the methods and 
modalities (the means) of law reform with careful allusion to the problems of 
institutional design and instrument choice.
With that confession of academic sin out of the way, I now feel less guilty 
(although just as inadequate) about offering this tribute to John McCamus as law 
reformer. For the over thirty-five years that I have known John, I have marvelled 
at his scholarship and his commitment to the law and its betterment. But my 
admiration goes deeper than mere passive observation. If you were to lay our 
curriculum vitae side-by-side you would observe that almost every role I have 
played in law—as professor, as Dean, as President of a Law Reform Commission, 
as Chair of a Task Force on Access to Justice, as Editor-in-Chief of a Law Journal, 
as Board Member of a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), as participant 
in foreign and international law reform bodies—I have done in John’s footsteps. I 
can only hope that as he reads this recitation he will resist the urge to take offence 
at me being a copycat. After all, everybody knows that imitation—whether 
conscious or inadvertent—is the sincerest form of flattery.
II. INTRODUCTION
I have entitled this essay “Law Reform for Dummies (3rd edition).” So as to 
avoid any misinterpretation suggesting disrespect of citizens, and to provide an 
overview of the essay’s basic theses, let me briefly explain that choice of title.
12. Ibid at 55.
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To begin, I focus in this essay on the law reform endeavour as seen from 
the perspective of citizens—that is, those people who experts in any given field 
delight in erroneously dismissing as ‘dummies.’ Over the past four decades, there 
has been a vast corpus of writing about law reform, by professionals (most often 
law professors), aimed at other professionals,13 and far too little writing about 
law reform either by non-professionals or aimed at the general public.14 But, as 
the popular “XYZ for Dummies” series of guidebooks reminds us, most fields of 
knowledge apparently dominated by ‘experts’ or ‘professionals’ are fully capable 
of being understood by the lay public. Law in particular need not, and should 
not, be the preserve of the knowledgeable (of the so-called cognoscenti). Because 
law itself is the affair of all citizens, ‘dummies’ must be key players in the law 
reform enterprise.
The growth of the public legal education (PLE) movement evidences the 
appetite of citizens for information about law and legal processes. Until now, 
PLE bodies have focused on producing publications that, like the “XYZ for 
13. I confess to having contributed inordinately to this literature set. See e.g. Roderick A 
Macdonald, “Access to Justice and Law Reform” (1990) 10 Windsor YB Access Just 287; 
Roderick A Macdonald, “Recommissioning Law Reform” (1997) 35:4 Alta L Rev 831; 
Roderick A Macdonald, “Triangulating Social Law Reform” in Y Gendreau, Dessiner la 
société par le droit (Montreal: Editions Thémis, 2004) at 119 [Macdonald, “Triangulating”]; 
Roderick A Macdonald & Hoi Kong, “Patchwork Law Reform: Your Idea is Good in Practice 
but it Won’t Work in Theory” (2006) 44:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 11 [Macdonald & Kong, 
“Patchwork Law Reform”]; Roderick A Macdonald, “Unitary Law Reform, Pluralistic Law 
Re-Substance: Illuminating Legal Change (2007) 67:4 La L Rev 1114. [Macdonald, “Unitary 
Law Reform”].
14. At the outset of its mandate, the Law Commission of Canada explicitly sought to change 
the register of law reform work and the target of its products. The Act Respecting the Law 
Commission of Canada mandated the Commission to constitute an Advisory Council. See 
RSC 1998, c L-6.7, s 18 [LCC Act]. Of the twenty appointed members of the Advisory 
Council, fourteen were not legally trained. Moreover, the LCC’s 1997 Strategic Agenda 
made clear the significant role that the LCC foresaw for citizens in the law reform process. 
Law Commission of Canada, Strategic Agenda (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1997) 
[LCC, Strategic Agenda 1997]. Under the leadership of Vice-President Nathalie Des Rosiers, 
extensive public consultation became a key feature of the Commission’s work. In developing 
its strategic agenda and its first five-year work plan the Commission canvassed the extant 
literature on law reform. The search turned up almost nothing aimed at citizens, either in the 
outputs of law reform commissions or in the critical literature about law reform produced 
by lawyers and law professors. For a discussion of the aims and ambitions of the Law 
Commission of Canada, see Roderick A Macdonald, “Law Reform and its Agencies” (2000) 
79:1 Can Bar Rev 99 [Macdonald, “Agencies”]; Roderick A Macdonald, “La réforme du droit 
et ses organismes” in Actes de la XIV Conférence des jurists de l’État (Montreal: Éditions Yvon 
Blais, 2000).
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Dummies” series, aim at providing how-to manuals in substantive fields of law: 
consumer law, wills and estates, landlord tenant, family law, personal income 
taxation, employment law, access to justice and courts, and so on. But there is 
clear evidence that citizens want more than simple information about law; they 
seek to understand, and they want to have a voice in, the law reform process.15 
Yet, despite this public interest, to my knowledge no one, including the most 
dedicated PLE organizations, has yet produced a book or pamphlet on how to be 
an effective participant in the official law reform process.16
My title is meant to signal, in addition, that much law reform (even much 
official law reform) is directly generated by the actions of the general public. In 
this sense, the concept of “Law Reform for Dummies” also means “Law Reform 
by Dummies.” Ideally, citizens in a democracy should be active participants in the 
process by which parliaments manage the legislative process. That participation 
does not consist only in the quadrennial election of their representatives. 
Democratic theory imagines that citizens will be afforded opportunities to 
contribute directly to law-making through personal engagement in legislative 
consultative processes, just as the jury represents recognition of the important 
participatory role of citizens in the criminal justice process. Moreover, and more 
importantly, by contrast with totalitarian states, in a liberal democracy there 
will always be significant social space where the state leaves to citizens some 
responsibility for elaborating the normative regimes governing their daily lives 
in interaction with each other. That is, the absence of direct regulation through 
official law does not imply the absence of law per se. Rather, the assumption 
15. Today there are many groups that support active citizen involvement in political affairs. 
For example, Citizens Academy has a mission to teach ratepayers how to talk to municipal 
councils. Online: <http://www.citizensacademy.ca/>. Other groups provide assistance to 
citizens making complaints about the police or offer support for those launching access to 
information requests. At one level these actions can be seen as participating in law reform 
but, unlike citizen interest groups that seek to change official law, law reform is not the 
primary agenda of most of these organizations.
16. One of the longstanding and most successful PLE programmes in Canada is the Community 
Law Programme at the University of Windsor. Beginning in the early 1970s, it undertook 
projects using a variety of different communication formats—videos, pamphlets, seminars, 
radio spots, a travelling Community Law Caravan, et cetera—on almost all the substantive 
topics noted in the text. It also produced a litigation resource compendium on the court 
system, small claims court, the framework of civil procedure and evidence. Yet, despite the 
broad scope of the Programme’s activities, it did not publish materials explaining the role of 
the public in law reform; nor did it undertake activities meant to provide citizens with the 
resources and skills to participate effectively in the law reform process.
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is that citizens themselves can and should be co-equal participants, in multiple 
normative sites, in the enterprise of law-making and dispute resolution.17
While this essay does not ignore the most visible specialized institutions for 
making proposals and recommendations to modify official law—namely, law 
reform commissions and analogous agencies—its concern is also with informal, 
unofficial law and unofficial agents of law reform.  Over the past decade, and 
following the lead of the OLRC in the early 1990s, many commissions sought 
to involve the general population in their work through advisory councils, 
community forums, town-hall meetings, and on-line consultations. Some, like 
the LCC, even published materials and consultative documents that could well 
have been sub-titled “Law Reform Commissions for Dummies (1st edition).”18 
Those initiatives represented a new and important departure for institutionalized 
law reform because they were grounded in the assumption that, ultimately, 
ownership of law reform resides with citizens and not with Parliament or its 
delegated agencies. The point of opening up processes of law reform in that 
way was to explore how the idea of law reform could be more responsive to 
public concerns. At the same time, the goal was to bring to consciousness the 
assumptions that the public holds about the law reform process, and to show how 
those assumptions play out in the reform of the law, wherever it is found.
Finally, the modifier “(3rd edition)” in the title reminds us that the theory 
and practice of law reform today is different from that which sustained the initial 
explosion of independent, expert law reform commissions in the 1960s. The 
past half-century has witnessed a constant evolution in the manner in which 
institutionalized law reform has been pursued.19 One might identify three different 
17. I do not claim that this characterization of quotidian citizen interaction as lawmaking 
holds for all theoretical approaches to law. Many legal positivists, for example, might well 
acknowledge multiple non-state normative orders but would classify them as regimes of 
social (not legal) norms. Compare Lon L Fuller, “Human Interaction and the Law” (1969) 
14 Am J Juris 1 (an early elaboration of the law-making role of everyday citizen interaction).
18. A brief review of activities of this type undertaken by the Law Commission of Canada in 
its first few years is contained in Roderick A Macdonald, “The Changing Dynamics of Law 
Reform” (Paper delivered at the Conference of Canadian Law Reform Agencies, 28-29 
March 1998) [unpublished].
19. The essays collected in the Promise of Law Reform by Brian Opeskin and David Weisbrot 
offer a compendious review of the origins and evolution of law reform agencies in the 
Commonwealth. See Brian Opeskin & David Weisbrot, eds, The Promise of Law Reform 
(Sydney: Federation Press, 2005) [Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform].
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models, each with a particular preoccupation, of the law reform endeavour.20 In 
a first round of reflection, attention was focused on the concept of reform. The 
ambition then was to create a mechanism for coordinating and structuring the 
great burst of energy aimed at the technical improvement official law. Whether 
the field was property, contract, torts, family law, successions, consumer law, 
landlord and tenant, real estate, or labour standards, it seemed that longstanding 
common law and statutory rules were in need of revision and updating.21 The 
main focus was black-letter private law and the primary research methodology 
was doctrinal comparison of the law of cognate jurisdictions. Although more 
and more fields of human activity became subject to regulation by governmental 
agencies over the next two decades, until the 1980s only rarely did commissions 
devote attention to the regulatory process, and even more rarely were there calls 
for policy analysis, empirical studies, and social law reform.22
In a subsequent round of institutional law reform, reflected especially but 
not exclusively in the work of a trio of second generation commissions—the 
20. For an elaboration of three models of law reform commissions in Canada written shortly 
following the demise of the LCC, see Roderick A Macdonald, “Jamais deux sans trois… 
Once Reform, Twice Commission, Thrice law” (2007) 22:2 CJLS 117 [Macdonald, 
“Jamais deux”]. In proposing these three models, I acknowledge that I may be emphasizing 
disjunctures that may be more differences of degree than differences in kind. The point, 
however, is to suggest that the preoccupations of institutional law reform agencies are not 
completely insulated from broader political tendencies in society and that only recently has 
a concern for, among other things, public consultation and input become a central theme in 
law reform commission work.
21. The reports of the OLRC over its first two decades reflect this orientation and are 
representative of the activities of other provincial law reform agencies. A complete listing of 
Commission Reports and Study Papers may be found in Appendix A of OLRC, Final Report, 
supra note 10 at 43-47.
22. A significant exception to this general orientation in the work of Canadian law reform 
commissions could be found in the projects undertaken by the Law Reform Commission 
of Canada (LRCC).  From the outset of its operations in 1971, this commission engaged in 
major projects of public law, commissioned important empirical studies, and explored legal 
questions with significant social policy implications. See JW Mohr, “Comment” (1974) 
12:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 421 (commenting on the article by JN Lyon entitled “Law Reform 
Needs Reform” published in the same issue); Edward F Ryan & The Honourable Mr. 
Justice Antonio Lamer, “The Path of Law Reform” (1977) 23:3 McGill LJ 519, Comment. 
Paradoxically, the work of the LRCC was subjected to greater scrutiny and more critique 
than other commissions, mainly because it was thought not to be sufficiently imaginative 
in pursuing this broader mandate. See e.g. Ross Hastings & RP Saunders, “Ideology in the 
Work of the Law Reform Commission of Canada: The Case of the Working Paper in the 
General Part” (1983) 25:2 Crim LQ 206; Teresa Scassa, “A Critical Overview of the Work 
of the Law Reform Commission of Canada: Learning from the Past” in Federal Law Reform 
Conference: Final Report (Halifax, NS: Atlantic Institute of Criminology, 1993).
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(LCC) (1997), the British Columbia Law Institute (BCLI) (1998), and the Law 
Commission of Ontario (LCO) (2007)—much more attention was placed on 
issues of public law and institutional design: What are the various agencies of 
law reform? How many varieties of law reform “commission” are there? What, if 
anything, are the specific strengths of the commission model of law reform?23 That 
change in orientation occurred in part because promoters of second-generation 
commissions were required to find novel ways to organize and finance law 
reform.24 Some first generation commissions also became more interested in and 
responsive to interdisciplinary approaches, such as law and economics during 
that period, but analytical positivism continued to be the dominant intellectual 
framework for most law reformers.25
Today, it may be argued, the practice of institutional law reform is entering 
a third iteration. Most significantly, at some commissions recent developments 
in legal theory are now informing how projects are conceived and conducted. In 
addition, the choice and framing of projects now shows the impact of increased 
socio-demographic diversity in Canada. For example, with the recognition 
of the importance of transnational law, religious law, indigenous law, and 
locally-generated non-official law, sociologists and anthropologists have begun 
23. For analysis and discussion of the anatomy of law commissions, see David Weisbrot, “The 
Future for Institutional Law Reform” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, supra 
note 19 at 18.
24. All three were resurrections of law reform commissions that had been closed by governments 
in the 1990s. The Law Commission of Canada was reconstituted as a departmental 
corporation accountable to Parliament through the Minister of Justice. LCC Act, supra 
note 14. It replaced the LRCC, which was closed by the government of Canada in 1992. 
The British Columbia Law Institute was created as an NGO in 1997 as a successor to the 
British Columbia Law Reform Commission, which was closed in March 1997. Its sixteen 
members include nine appointed by its sponsors, the Ministry of the Attorney General, 
the Law Society of British Columbia, the British Columbia Branch of the Canadian Bar 
Association, the three law faculties in British Columbia, and the British Columbia Society of 
Notaries Public. The LCO was established in 2007, ten years after the OLRC was defunded 
by the Ontario government. It is a partnership among the Ministry of the Attorney General 
of Ontario, the Law Society of Upper Canada, Osgoode Hall Law School, and the Law 
Foundation of Ontario. It also receives funding and in-kind support from York University. 
The other law faculties in Ontario are “supporters” of the LCO and, along with the current 
funders of the commission other than York University, were parties to the agreement to 
establish the LCO.
25. For discussion of the central themes in the theory of law reform at this time see Roderick 
Macdonald, “Continuity, Discontinuity, Stasis and Innovation” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, 
Promise of Law Reform, supra note 19 at 87.
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to play a larger role in shaping inquiry into law reform.26 Surprisingly, however, 
few law commissions have sought to theorize their new practices. The question of 
how one would undertake the endeavour of law reform from a socio-legal point 
of view remains largely unexplored.27 This is an issue I take up in the substantive 
sections of this essay.
I have organized my reflections as a contrarian take on conventional wisdom 
about processes of law reform and law reform commissions. I explicitly adopt a 
legal pluralist perspective so as to highlight the multiple roles that citizens play 
in the reform of official and unofficial law in Canada.28 In so doing, I also aim to 
illustrate two collateral points: Neither is there anything necessary about official 
law reform commissions as agents of law reform, nor are those commissions 
always the optimal vehicle for engaging citizens actively in law reform processes.29
I now turn to my first theme.
26. See Audrey Macklin, “Law Reform Error: Retry or Abort?” (1993) 16:2 Dal LJ 395; Don 
Chalmers, “Science, Medicine and Health and the Work of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, supra note 19 at 374.
27. For a rare recent attempt to grapple with the theoretical challenges, see Marcia Neave “Law 
Reform and Social Justice” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, supra note 19 at 
358.  For earlier efforts, see RA Samek, “A Case for Social Law Reform” (1977) 55:3 Can Bar 
Rev 409; Macdonald, “Triangulating,” supra note 13.
28. I acknowledge that there are many hypotheses of legal pluralism. For present purposes, I shall 
take my own perspective as an example. See Roderick A Macdonald, “Custom Made—For a 
Non-chirographic Critical Legal Pluralism” (2011) 26:2 CJLS 301. For two essays about law 
reform that adopt this conception of legal pluralism, see Macdonald & Kong, “Patchwork 
Law Reform,” supra note 13; Macdonald, “Unitary Law Reform,” supra note 13.
29. There is, admittedly, something of a paradox in entitling this essay as “Law Reform for 
Dummies (3rd edition).”  Its goals seem at odds with its form. That is, this is another 
theoretical article written by a legal expert intended to be read by other legal experts and 
published in a venue read by legal experts. Yet its primary message is that more law reform 
needs to acknowledge the role that citizens play in law reform and that if we examine law 
reform from a legal pluralist perspective we will see how much contemporary law reform is 
in fact effectuated by citizens and not parliaments and courts. Should not, therefore, this 
essay be written in more accessible language and published in a popular, non-professional 
venue? Of course, the general public should be informed of its law reform role and should 
be conscripted overtly into formal law reform processes. Many of the conferences and public 
speeches of the LCC took this approach to promoting law reform. See e.g. Macdonald, 
Lessons of Everyday Law, supra note 11. At the same time, the LCC also directed its message 
at educating legal professionals to this reality. See Roderick A Macdonald, “Law Reform and 
its Agencies” (2000) 79:1 Can Bar Rev 99. Given that this article is intended as a tribute to 
John McCamus’ professional career, it has been purposely cast in the latter mode.
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III. LEGAL CHANGE AND LAW REFORM THROUGH THE LENS 
OF LEGAL PLURALISM
One of John McCamus’ singular contributions to law reform has been his clear 
but subtle sense of what the enterprise of law comprises. As a result, he has rarely 
been dogmatic about the goals of law reform, about how it should be pursued, in 
what fora, and by whom.30
For John, one of the central aspirations of law reform must be to engage the 
general public in the process of reconceiving the law to ensure that it is relevant, 
responsive, effective, equally accessible to all, and just. Law is not brute fact, but is a 
fragile human accomplishment, which is at once a powerful and dynamic human 
institution. It reflects, at the same time as it helps to shape, the character of a 
society. Law is a powerful lens through which citizens are able to view and judge 
their society. Over time, it comes to express citizens’ beliefs and convictions as 
well as their prejudices and pathologies.
While contemporary states have established numerous legal institutions like 
legislatures, courts, and regulatory agencies to identify and promote the values 
to which they aspire, John understood law in modern society to comprise more 
than the norms produced and administered by those official bodies. Some of 
the most fundamental coordinating rules by which Canadians organize their 
lives together are neither enacted by Parliament and provincial legislatures nor 
formally recognized and applied by courts and administrative agencies. These 
unofficial rules arise in multiple sites of daily human interaction.
Many people—most especially legal professionals—do not consider the 
informal law of everyday practice and usage as real law. They hold that only 
statutes and judicial decisions are a true legal reflection of a society’s quest for 
justice. On that view, because law is an official institutional product, law reform 
also must be an official institutional product; just as there can be no informal law, 
there can be no informal (or unofficial) law reform. By contrast, scholars who, 
like John, have toiled in the manifold vineyards of law reform know that all legal 
artefacts—both formal and informal—are in constant evolution. Institutional 
30. The following three paragraphs are adapted from the LCC’s 1997 Strategic Agenda and the 
first Annual Report of the LCC, which were themselves inspired by conversations between 
John McCamus and the author at the Law Reform 2000 Conference of the Federation of 
Law Reform Agencies of Canada, held in Edmonton, Alberta on March 28-29, 1998. See 
LCC, Strategic Agenda 1997, supra note 14; Law Commission of Canada, Annual Report 
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1998).
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law reform occupies an important, but modest, place in the ongoing endeavour 
of legal change.
Some fifteen years ago, as President of the LCC, I visited junior elementary 
schools across Canada to make presentations about law and law reform. On one 
memorable trip to Charles Webster School I ended my talk with the following 
question: “So then, where do we find law?”31 A young girl was the first to respond 
and offered an unusual answer: “Under the bed.” Under the bed? I had been 
expecting a response like “in law books” or possibly, “in Parliament” or “in 
courts,” or even “in the police station” or “in prison” or “in lawyers’ offices.” Her 
evocation of the gremlins and other unspeakables that hide themselves under the 
beds of children caught me short.
Not surprisingly, I was unable to formulate an intelligent follow-up on the 
spot. The response of that student was so far beyond what I was anticipating that 
I could not quickly find a way to link it with the theme of my presentation. But 
some weeks later, as I was preparing the introductory section of the LCC’s second 
Annual Report, I realized that her answer was not so off the mark—although 
perhaps not in the way she intended. Her answer was another way of asking why 
we should think that law is found only in the official organs of the state that 
interpret and enforce the norms enacted by legislatures. After all, we have long 
recognized that health and disease are not just found in hospitals, clinics, medical 
laboratories, doctor’s offices, ambulances, and morgues.32 Indeed, the whole field 
of scholarly inquiry called public health engages holistic reflection about well 
being and disease. By contrast, however, such general reflection about the scope 
of inquiry has not acquired pride of place in scholarly writing about law and 
justice. Very few scholars have taken up Lon Fuller’s challenge to see law as the 
quest for good and workable arrangements for facilitating human interaction.33
31. Charles E Webster Junior Public School is located at 1900 Keele Street in Toronto, a few 
blocks above Eglinton Avenue. It was opened in 1952 as the Charles E Webster Elementary 
School. I was a pupil there from 1953-1960, where I passed successively from K to grade 
8. In the 1950s, it served a mixed population ranging from welfare families to the children 
of doctors, pharmacists, and lawyers. Today, however, the school caters primarily to a 
lower socio-economic stratum. Ontario Ministry of Education, Elementary School Profile, 
Charles E Webster Public School, online: <http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/sift/schoolProfile.
asp?SCH_NUMBER=101605#demo>.
32. For an indirect reflection on the differences, see Chalmers, supra note 26. I do not go so 
far as to say that official law is like a nosocomial infection the way the hospital diseases are 
nosocomial infections.
33. Fuller first elaborated this challenge, which he labeled eunomics. See Lon L Fuller, “American 
Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century,” Book Review of Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law 
by Edwin W Patterson, (1954) 6:4 J Legal Educ 457. For a thorough study of Fuller’s work 
on eunomics, see Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate (Oxford: Hart, 2012).
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Regardless of what my young respondent may have intended, I took the 
phrase “under the bed” to mean “any place that we would not normally consider 
looking … or might even be afraid to look.” In that insight she was revealing herself 
to be a thoughtful legal pluralist and at the same time an unlikely candidate for 
success as a law student. After all, most activity in law faculties assumes that law 
is about creating and using officially-enacted rules either to avoid having state 
power visited upon oneself or to conscript state power to coerce others into doing 
what one desires. But her unusual answer set me thinking about how one might 
one go about “reforming” the law that is found “under the bed.” Does “under the 
bed law” even have a form that could be reformed?
These questions suggest a key theme in contemporary approaches to law 
reform. Assuming that law is understood as “the enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules,” what would legal pluralistic law reform look 
like?34
To pursue this inquiry, I realized, would require jettisoning three postulates 
of orthodox approaches to organized law reform. First, it would be necessary to 
accept that law reform, like law itself, need not be institutionalized in a particular 
way. A specialized, independent, expert agency would be only one site of law 
reform, and official law would be only one of its research targets. Interestingly 
enough, the mandate of some law reform agencies was and is sufficiently broad 
to encompass “under the bed” law.35 But despite this license to think broadly 
34. The phrase in quotations is from Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2d ed (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969) at 106.
35. Consider, for example, the legislative mandate of the former LCC:
… to study and keep under systematic review, in a manner that reflects the concepts and 
institutions of the common law and the civil law systems, the law of Canada and its effects, 
with a view to providing independent advice on improvements, modernization and reform 
that will ensure a just legal system that meets the changing need of Canadian society and 
individuals in that society.
 LCC Act, supra note 14, s 3. The earlier Law Reform Commission of Canada Act framed 
an equally broad mandate that included: “(d) the development of new approaches to and 
new concepts of the law in keeping with and responsive to the changing needs of modern 
Canadian society of individual members of that society.” RSC 1985, c L-7, s 11. The current 
LCO has a mandate to: “(a) make the legal system more relevant, accessible and efficient; 
(b) simplify or clarify the law; (c) use technology to increase access to justice; (d) stimulate 
critical debate about law, and (e) promote scholarly legal research.” Law Commission of 
Ontario, “The LCO’s Mandate and Underlying Values,” online: <http://lco-cdo.org/en/
strategic-plan-2008-2012-sectionIII>. By contrast, section 2(1)(a) of the original Ontario 
Law Reform Commission Act cast the primary mission of the OLRC somewhat more narrowly, 
focusing on “reform of the law having regard to the statute law, the common law and judicial 
decisions.” SO 1964, c 78.
(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL874
about law reform, the projects taken on by many tend to be similar to those 
one would expect from a Department of Justice; law reform is the business of 
proposing technical improvements to the official law of Canada.36 Moreover, even 
in jurisdictions where a substantial policy development branch is attached to the 
Department of Justice, law reform initiatives for the most part aim at simple 
tinkering with existing conceptual categories and structures of official law.37
Second, the methodologies and expected outputs of the law reform process 
would have to be broadened and pluralized. For the past fifty years projects 
typically privileged input from official legal actors and reports routinely 
concluded with proposals for legislative change.38 The idea that there is a canonical 
type of norm by which law reform is to be pursued is consistent with the idea 
that there is a canonical institution meant to handle the task. Where a statute 
is being modified in whole or in part, it is reasonable to assume that the form 
of the proposed modification should be a standard-issue statute. But need this 
be the case with respect to other forms of official normativity like custom and 
judicially-declared law (the common law)?39
Imagine that the entire field of official law being examined were to consist 
of common law rules, and assume that the proposed reform is to modify one or 
more specific legal principles. Instead of including a draft statute in an appendix, 
why could the report of a law reform agency not conclude with one or more 
36. This observation does not, however, apply to the LCC. Especially under the leadership of 
my successors as President, the Commission’s reports sought to empower other actors to 
recognize their own law reform potential and responsibility. See the review of the LCC’s work 
in Nathalie Des Rosiers, “In Memoriam: La Commission du droit du Canada / the Law 
Commission of Canada, 1997-2006” (2007) 22:2 CJLS 145 [Des Rosiers, “In Memoriam”]. 
Since 2007, the LCO also seems to be pursuing a similar agenda.
37. Even when the suggested improvements aim at deregulation, or the withdrawal of official law 
from a given field of human conduct, there is rarely a concomitant attempt to discuss what 
the unofficial replacement norms would look like. The assumption appears to be that once a 
field is opened for citizen norm-generation, there is nothing that a law commission should or 
could contribute to that informal norm-creation process.
38. Once again, especially in the period after 2000, the LCC took an innovative approach 
to outputs. It produced materials other than printed reports, consulted broadly among 
Canadians and sought to explore the living law in official sites such as the workplace. See 
Yves Le Bouthilier, “Introduction: The Law Commission of Canada / La Commission du 
droit du Canada” (2007) 22:2 CJLS 113.
39. For an elaboration of this point see Lani Blackman, “Products of Law Reform Agencies” in 
Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, supra note 19 at 102.
MACDONALD, LAW REFORM FOR DUMMIES 875
discursive judgments of the type delivered by a court?40  These judgments would 
then be presented to a legislature to be enacted as common law rules deemed 
to emanate from the highest court of competent jurisdiction.41 Alternatively, 
might not the report of an agency recommend modifying the common law by 
means of a legislative overruling of one or more particular judicial decisions? 
Such an enactment might simply provide, for example, “the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher is abolished.”42 Of course, “under the bed law reform” would not only 
have to embrace the enactment of norms in non-statutory form, it would also 
have to incorporate non-legislative strategies for legal change that reflect the same 
informal practices and processes by which the norms of “under the bed law” 
come into existence.
Third, an approach that embraced “under the bed law” would contest the 
postulate that law reform is episodic and discontinuous. Notwithstanding that 
the mission of contemporary law reform commissions is frequently stated in 
open-ended language, the expected deliverables are typically a series of specific 
recommendations to improve particular legal doctrines, concepts and rules, and 
to eliminate obsolescence and anomalies in official law that can be implemented 
by a legislature.43 Behind this conception of the enterprise lies the belief that 
official law can only be changed by a discrete and explicit act of legislative or 
judicial will. The idea that law reform might consist of an ongoing process of 
40. During the 1990s, the OLRC did publish reports that suggested the need for legal change 
to be effected not by legislation but by judicial action. See e.g. the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, Report on Exemplary Damages (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 
1991). Nonetheless, the form of these recommendations was classical and did not reflect the 
suggestion set out in the text.
41. The idea that a body of unenacted law may be enacted by incorporation is not unknown to 
the common law.  Indeed orthodox reception statutes such as the Property and Civil Rights 
Act of Upper Canada enacted in 1792 do exactly that. For the current statute, see Property 
and Civil Rights Act, RSO 1990, c P-29.
42. Some provincial legislatures in Canada acted in this way with statutes purporting to abolish 
the rule in Purefoy v Rogers, but such approaches have rarely been advanced by law reform 
commissions. One of the most interesting attempts to modify the common law without 
actually stating the new rule in positive language can be seen in the United Kingdom’s 
Animals Act, which was enacted specifically to overrule a decision of the House of Lords 
in the following terms: “(1) So much of the rules of the common law relating to liability for 
negligence as excludes or restricts the duty which a person might owe to others to take such care 
as is reasonable to see that damage is not caused by animals straying on to a highway is hereby 
abolished.” See Animals Act  (UK), c 22, s 8.
43. See Brian Opeskin, “Measuring Success” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, 
supra note 19 at 202; John Hannaford, “Implementation,” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise 
of Law Reform, supra note 19 at 222.
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implicit legal change has no place in the official model of law reform. But “under 
the bed law” in all its permutations is in constant flux since its constituting 
practices are themselves constantly in flux; and this normative flux is every bit as 
much law reform as a ukase issued by a legislature or a court. 44
Together these three assumptions paint a picture of law reform as a particular 
type of legal change that finds its justification in the hypothesis that, absent such 
change, the law remains static and quickly becomes out of date: Legal change 
is held to be the exception, and legal stability is the norm.45 As noted, the legal 
pluralist approach contests all three orthodoxies. Not surprisingly, in the manner 
of Heraclitus, legal pluralists hypothesize “change” not “stasis” as the foundational 
legal condition—even of official law.46
Legal pluralists acknowledge that the text of a statute can change only when 
the authorized constitutional procedure is followed. So too they acknowledge 
that the specific language of a judicial decision, once rendered, is immutable. 
Certainly the linguistic “support” through which the legal norm is expressed has 
a formalistic character. But this does not mean that the norm to which the words 
of a statute or a judgment point itself remains fixed. For example, courts have 
been known to make decisions on the basis of legislation not yet proclaimed 
in force, especially ameliorative penal legislation. Occasionally, they simply 
interpret statutes contrary to the express text of a statute or code. Again, imagine 
a longstanding statutory rule the textual meaning of which is so encrusted 
with barnacles of judicial interpretation that the actual text of the statute is 
no longer litigated. Orthodox theory now holds that courts may reverse their 
earlier decisions about the meaning of a legislative rule. Because the mere act of 
application is an act of normative reshaping, every judicial decision affects the 
normative imprint of a statutory rule. So even where a court does not explicitly 
announce a reversal or modification of an interpretation of a statutory norm, we 
can see evidence of legal change.
44. One of the most prolific scholars to argue for the inherent movement of law and legal ideas 
has been the Scottish comparativist, Alan Watson. See especially Alan Watson, Society and 
Legal Change, 2d ed (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001); Alan Watson, Sources of 
Law, Legal Change, and Ambiguity, 2d ed (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1998); Alan Watson, The Evolution of Western Private Law (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001).
45. For a provocative discussion that offers a powerful challenge to this idea, see Robert Samek, 
“Beyond the Stable State of Law” (1976) 8:3 Ottawa L Rev 549.
46. For the full implications of the pluralist approach to legal change, see Emmanuel Melissaris, 
Ubiquitous Law (London, UK: Ashgate, 2009).
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Where a common law rule is concerned, the fact of constant normative 
change is even more obvious. Despite the doctrine of stare decisis, lower courts 
routinely depart from appellate decisions, either through overt or clandestine 
judicial extension, limitation or overruling of a precedent.47 Yet the theory remains 
entrenched. Some years ago the Kelly Commission in Ontario was struck to deal 
with the backlog of cases in the Court of Appeal.48 It proposed the creation of 
two divisions of the court: a law-applying division and a law reform division that 
had explicit authority to modify existing precedents. Not only was the proposed 
distinction in appellate functions untenable, it rested on the assumption that 
there can be pure adjudication that does not modify the meaning and scope of 
the norm ostensibly being applied. The Kelly Commission’s recommendations 
were never adopted, in part because critics were successful in convincing the 
government that even were such a formal division of appellate function to 
be legislated, implicit change to common law rules through constant judicial 
interpretation would continue unabated.49
Of course, it is not just courts and professional legal practice that effect 
changes to official law. Legal rules are meant as guides to human behaviour. 
As long as everyday practices seem to track these rules we see official law as 
unchanged. But what if they do not? Imagine that a group of businesspeople 
in a particular industry interact in conformity with a certain understanding 
of what performance of a contract requires. When an outsider contests that 
understanding in court on the grounds that the practice does not conform to the 
accepted judicial interpretation of the relevant common law or statutory rule, the 
question arises whether the law has changed. Only rarely will courts accept that 
a change in practice can change the textual expression of judicially or legislatively 
announced law. Rather, they will use an array of procedural doctrines such as 
acquiescence, laches, estoppel, and so on, to prevent (in that case) the litigant 
from denying the normative change consequent on accepted practices within the 
industry in question.
47. Melvin Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 
1991); Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008).
48. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Speedy justice for the litigant; Sound jurisprudence 
for the province – Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of Ontario (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1977) (Chair: The 
Honorable Arthur Kelly).
49. For an assessment of the Kelly Commission Report, see RA Macdonald, “Speedy Justice for 
the Litigant: Sound Jurisprudence for the Province” (1978) 16:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 603.
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The point may be generalized beyond norm-creating practices in business 
interaction. The central insight of a legal pluralistic approach is to recognize that, 
however static the law in books, the living law is always in motion.50 Citizens 
are always the most important law reformers, constantly changing the substance 
of official written law through their practices. Even more importantly, their 
normative efforts are directed not just to official law. Quotidian interaction in 
myriad situations is the generator of the everyday law that is constantly being 
made and remade by citizens. Together, citizens renew the law by living the law, 
often managing to redress the injustices of an official law that legislatures are 
unable or unwilling to change. The unofficial practices by which this everyday 
law is constituted, debated, followed, and ignored are the real engines of official 
law reform.
The most obvious reflection of direct citizen law reform can be seen in 
jury nullification, either of a criminal prohibition or, in states that still permit 
civil juries, of settled doctrines of private law. Only under the most dogmatic 
definition of law would it be possible to hold that the consistent refusal by juries 
to convict abortionist Dr. Henry Morgentaler did not constitute law reform.51 
Inversely, sometimes law reform occurs by preventing legal action. Where a 
legislature is unable to pass new law (to overrule jury nullification, for example) 
as a result of public opinion, one sees legal change through the prevention of 
legislative action and the reliance on practice to establish relevant norms. In both 
examples, the story is one of law reform by citizens through changing judicial 
outcomes, not changing legislative inputs. For a legal pluralist, traditional legal 
theory notwithstanding, all modes of legal change comprise law reform.
Over four decades, John McCamus has been a powerful agent of law reform. 
Whatever classical understandings may prescribe as the optimal vehicles to achieve 
law reform—law reform commissions, task forces and public inquiries—John’s 
most sustained law reform endeavours have occurred elsewhere; in practice, in 
NGOs, in his scholarship, and in the classroom. Moreover, while he has attended 
to the formal deposit of official law in his two treatises, his research, practice, and 
NGO service have also been directed to the multiple sites of informal normative 
50. The point is not new and was thoughtfully theorized by Eugen Erlich a century ago. For 
recent appreciations, see Marc Hertogh, ed, Living Law (Oxford: Hart, 2008); Donald 
Fyson, Magistrates, Police and People:  Everyday Criminal Justice in Quebec and Lower Canada 
(Montreal: Hurtubise, 2010).
51. Morgentaler v The Queen, [1976] 1 SCR 616, 53 DLR (3d) 161; R v Morgentaler, [1988] 
1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 1. For early examples of jury nullification in Canada see R Blake 
Brown, A Trying Question: The Jury in Nineteenth Century Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009).
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engagement where “under the bed law” is generated and developed. This is why, 
whether or not he would characterize his approach as that of a legal pluralist, legal 
pluralists would have no difficulty in characterizing him as one of theirs.
This brings me to my second theme.
IV. SITES AND MODES OF LEGAL PLURALISTIC LAW 
REFORM
Despite John’s extensive experience in provoking, recognizing, and managing legal 
change in a variety of sites, many observers see his impact on law reform as best 
exemplified in his years as Chair of the OLRC. Still, even in that orthodox role 
he displayed creativity and a sense of the possible that was genuinely innovative.
Throughout his career, John has not been afraid to ask law reform’s hardest 
question of process: On a case-by-case basis, what is the optimal means, 
including a conscious decision not to propose explicit legal change, for achieving 
a particular policy goal? Embedded in this question are two inquiries. One aims 
at “instrument choice” or the “site” of law reform: In any given situation, what 
formal or informal institution is best placed to pursue the desired law reform 
agenda? The other is directed to “institutional design” or the “mode” of law 
reform: Once the appropriate site for managing reform has been determined, 
what are the most apposite methods by which law reform should be carried 
forward?52
Much attention over the past three decades has focussed on the first of 
these questions, as we have witnessed the waxing and waning of one site—the 
independent law reform commission.53 Interestingly, however, while the idea of 
such independent commissions now seems to be in decline among professional 
politicians, the mandate, mission, and methodologies of surviving commissions 
have evolved to reflect the richness of contemporary conceptions of law. For 
example, the strategic agendas of the resurrected, though later abolished, LCC54 
and the LCO have been oriented not just to the recognition and improvement 
52. These two inquiries are inter-related. For example, if it is thought that a law reform 
commission force rather than the promotion of a body of innovative scholarship is optimal in 
a given situation, there is a strong likelihood that a legislative solution will be recommended. 
Conversely, if it is concluded that an evolution in common law is preferable to legislation, it 
is likely that a dedicated inquiry or task force will be chosen as the reform vehicle.
53. Macdonald, “Jamais deux,” supra note 20.
54. To simplify the syntax of presenting the work of the LCC and the LCO in parallel, I shall 
refer to the former throughout this part as if it were still in existence.
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of law that can be found “under the bed”;55 so too has their conception of the 
tools and outputs of law reform “where the wild things are.”56 In their work one 
can find the intellectual legacy of John McCamus, masquerading as Maurice 
Sendak.57
As second-generation law reform agencies, the LCC and the LCO have a 
pair of features that distinguish them from their predecessors. First, their work 
is more connected to the specific intellectual and research preoccupations of 
the contemporary legal academy. While earlier commissions were also closely 
connected to law faculties, the types of research they undertook reflected 
orientations of particular interest to the legal profession.58 Second, much more 
than earlier law reform commissions, second-generation agencies’ studies and 
reports take cognizance of insights developed by different strands of critical legal 
theory.59 Not surprisingly, the design of projects and research of these newer 
commissions has been focussed less on the analysis and critique of existing legal 
55. See supra, note 35 for the legislative mandates of these two commissions. The 1998 Strategic 
Agenda of the Law Commission of Canada set out its mission statement as follows: “The 
Mission of the Law Commission of Canada is to engage Canadians in the renewal of the 
law to ensure that it is relevant, responsive, equally accessible to all, and just.” LCC, Strategic 
Agenda 1998, supra note 10 at 1. According to its website, the mission of the LCO is: 
“Recommending law reform measures to make the law accessible to all Ontarians.” Online: 
<http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/liaison-fall-2012>.
56. Both commissions contemplate a variety of techniques for public consultation, and a variety 
of outputs in addition to published Reports. The Annual Reports of the Law Commission of 
Canada from 2001-2005 during the Presidency of Nathalie Des Rosiers display a remarkable 
variety of activities and law reform products. For the equally creative approach of the LCO, 
see online: <http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/what-we-do>. See also Des Rosiers, “In Memoriam,” 
supra note 37.
57. Maurice Sendak, Where the Wild Things Are (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).
58. For example, the Alberta Law Reform Institute has always been housed within a Faculty 
of Law, the OLRC and British Columbia Law Reform Commission routinely requested 
professors to undertake research studies or to act as project directors, and the Chairs of 
other commissions were often full-time law professors. In addition, these commissions 
also recruited legal academics as key researchers on their various projects. Today, the LCO 
is housed at Osgoode Hall Law School and counts the six Ontario law faculties among its 
founding partners.
59. Early in its existence, the LCC sponsored or co-sponsored several panels or symposia 
designed in part to familiarize its research staff not just with new developments in relevant 
areas of the law, but also with current debates in legal theory. The LCC also supported 
the attendance of its research staff at academic conferences devoted to emerging critical 
theoretical approaches.
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categories and more on how social issues may be apprehended by law—what 
Hans Mohr and Robert Samek called “social law reform.”60
In other words, these second-generation commissions have been willing 
to take their distance from mere tinkering with official law, leaving much of 
that doctrinal task to others. The past twenty years have witnessed the growth 
of a bevy of private contractors (including those who, but for a government 
research contract, would be called lobbyists for a particular interest group) and 
consultancies like accounting conglomerates that compete to undertake first-order 
analysis of particular legal rules and concepts. In addition, governments have 
shown greater inclination to establish ad hoc Royal Commissions, ministerial 
inquiries, and external task forces designed to address specific legally-constructed 
problems and to propose legislative reforms.61 Given the contemporary 
tendency towards economic globalization, it is also unsurprising that a more 
active law reform role is being assumed by international organizations like the 
United Nations Comission of International Trade Law,62 Unidroit,63 the World 
Intellectual Property Organization,64 the International Chamber of Commerce,65 
the International Maritime Organization,66 the Hague Convention,67 the World 
Bank,68 and in the criminal law sphere by, for example, the International Criminal 
Court69 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.70 The 
work of most of those bodies, especially in the private law domain, resembles that 
60. See, in particular, Mohr, supra note 22. Hans Mohr is a central figure in law reform in 
Canada, having been a Commissioner on the initial Law Reform Commission of Canada and 
later a key member of the Advisory Council of the Law Commission of Canada.
61. For a review of these other sites of law reform, see Ralph Simmonds, “Professional and 
Private Bodies” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, supra note 19 at 261; Ronald 
Sackville, “Law Reform Agencies and Royal Commissions: Toiling in the Same Field?” in 
Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, supra note 19 at 274; Laurie Glanfield, “Law 
Reform Through the Executive” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, supra note 
19 at 288;  Marise Payne, “Law Reform and the Legislature” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise 
of Law Reform, supra note 19 at 302;  Sir Anthony Mason, “Law Reform and the Courts” 
in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, supra note 19 at 314; Michael Coper, “Law 
Reform and Legal Education: Uniting Separate Worlds” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of 
Law Reform, supra note 19 at 388.
62. Online: <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html>.
63. Online:  <http://www.unidroit.org/>.
64. Online: <http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en>.
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of first-generation law reform commissions, with their focus on conventions and 
protocols, model laws, and legislative guides.71
John McCamus has played a role in almost all these sites of law reform. But 
his most significant and lasting contribution has been to prepare the ground 
for twenty-first century law commissions to focus on the multiple unofficial 
legal regimes within which citizens live the norms of everyday law. In his final 
report as Chair of the OLRC, John reviewed the rationales for modern law 
reform commissions, suggesting future directions for both their mandates and 
methodologies.72 He pointed out the need for an agency that could: adopt a 
longer-term perspective, anticipating what kind of law will be needed in the 
future; take a multi-disciplinary approach; and genuinely engage the public in 
the formulation of projects and outputs. These observations, drawing on his 
work with the OLRC and with the Fundamental Issues Group of the Ontario 
Civil Justice Review,73 constitute a prescient foreshadowing of the path of law 
reform down to the present.
A driving concern in John’s conception of law reform was to enhance and to 
broaden processes of consultation at all phases of the endeavour. Where law reform 
is dominated by the political process, the choice of project topics and the manner 
of their formulation will be influenced, if not dictated, by the policy perspectives 
of the government of the day. Establishing an independent commission opens 
the door, at least in theory, to a much wider and less politicized reform agenda 
and invites engagement with the general public as to the projects that should 
be undertaken. John was a pioneer in reflecting on how consultations should 
take place.74 Following his lead, the LCC developed an elaborate protocol that 
identified four distinct moments when public consultations would be organized.
71. See Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, eds, Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press) [forthcoming December 2014]; Gralf-Peter Calliess & Peer 
Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law 
(Oxford: Hart, 2010).
72. OLRC, Final Report, supra note 10 at 18-23.
73. Ibid at 11, 27. John’s introduction to the three volumes, published in connection with 
the Civil Justice Review, were an insightful elaboration of the aims and methodologies 
of law reform that have been pursued over the fifteen subsequent years. See Ontario Law 
Reform Commission, Rethinking Civil Justice: Research Studies for the Civil Justice Review, 
vols 1 & 2 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1996) (Chair: John D McCamus); Ontario Law 
Reform Commission Study Paper on Prospects for Civil Justice (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, 1996).
74. See OLRC, Final Report, supra note 10 at 19, 22-23, citing Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, Annual Report, (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1967) at 7, 28.
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A foundational theme is that commissions should engage the public as early 
as the development of a strategic agenda and work plan. Today, commissions 
typically establish multidisciplinary and socio-demographically diverse advisory 
committees to assist in this task.75 Formalized consultation also should occur 
during the development phase of individual research projects. Multidisciplinary 
expertise and socio-demographic diversity are once again central goals that drive 
the design of project advisory committees. Occasionally, a complex project 
might be supported by more than one advisory committee. Throughout the 
life of projects, commissions now routinely organize scholarly workshops, 
information panels, and public forums to solicit feedback about the direction 
projects are taking.76 This phase of consultation also deploys electronic media, 
including chat-rooms, on-line questionnaires, and video presentations to seek 
public input. And finally, the release of one or more study papers and public 
consultation papers (often accompanied with a survey instrument seeking input 
on specific questions) has become a key vehicle for developing and pre-testing the 
recommendations in reports.77
Current experience with broadened public consultation suggests the value of 
such activities to improving the end product. In particular, frequent consultation 
at all stages of a project tends to keep the work more sensitive to the social 
impacts of proposals, and broadens recommendations beyond proposals of the 
black-letter law type. Such multi-dimensional consultations invite citizens to 
contemplate and articulate the normative structure of the community in which 
they wish to live, while avoiding polemical expressions of self-interest. Finally, 
continual attentiveness to public input changes the manner in which reports 
are presented and disseminated. Videos, CDs, websites, community forums, 
75. The OLRC established an Advisory Board in 1989, and the LCC was given an Advisory 
Council by its constitutive legislation (LCC Act, supra note 14, ss 18, 19). On the LCC 
Advisory Council, see Macdonald, “Agencies,” supra note 14 at 103-04.  See generally, Ian 
Davis, “Targeted Consultations” in Opeskin & Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, supra note 
19, 148 at 151-52.
76. The systematic deployment of these mechanisms of public consultation can be traced to the 
work of certain Royal Commissions of Inquiry such as the Rowell-Sirois Commission of the 
late 1930s. Perhaps the most ambitious contemporary inquiries in this regard have been the 
LeDain Commission, the Macdonald Commission and the Dussault-Erasmus Commission. 
For a discussion of the consultation methodology of the LeDain Commission, see M Green, 
“Gerald LeDain and the War against the War on Drugs” [forthcoming 2014].
77. See generally, Nathalie Des Rosiers, “Engaging Canadians in Law Reform” (Speech delivered 
at the Nova Scotia Legal Information Society, March 2001) [unpublished]; Davis, supra note 
75 at 152-57; Roslyn Atkinson, “Law Reform and Community Participation” in Opeskin & 
Weisbrot, Promise of Law Reform, supra note 19 at 160.
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and radio panel discussions expand the audience for law reform beyond legal 
professionals and legislators.78
That is truly legal pluralistic law reform, involving input from and sensitivity 
to multiple constituencies reflecting multiple sites of informal law. Regrettably, 
however, despite the desire of today’s commissions to avoid capture by special 
interests, it has proved difficult to temper the impact of organized industry groups 
that seek to shape projects to address their particular concerns.79
There are two dangers attendant upon broad-based public consultations. 
Law reform romantics are wont to see unlimited public consultation as an 
unvarnished good, perhaps having the seventeenth-century “Levelers” in view 
as a model, while ignoring the twenty-first century “Tea-Partiers.” Unless the 
consultation is carefully organized and managed, citizen responses can be sporadic, 
unrepresentative, and unfocused. More seriously, in such cases consultations tend 
to be dominated by citizens who have already adopted fixed (and often polemical) 
positions on the issues being discussed.80 This is particularly the case with citizen 
participation in projects that have an avowedly social law reform dimension.81 
Given the consultation imperative, contemporary law reform is increasingly 
beholden to narrowly-framed partisan—or NIMBY-DINK—lobbying.82 The 
acronym NIMBY (not in my back yard) draws our attention to the fact that 
in almost every law reform proposal, some sector of the population will bear a 
disproportionate burden of the reform; the acronym DINK (double income, no 
78. See Blackman, supra note 39 at 187.  See also, Macdonald, “Agencies,” supra note 14 at 
114-15.
79. For acknowledgements of the danger, see OLRC, Final Report, supra note 10 at 22; 
Simmonds, supra note 61 at 267-72.
80. Consultations are notoriously difficult to manage when public meetings are flooded with 
people who imagine that their rights and interests and beliefs are justified by and lodged in 
the constitution, holy writ, immutable custom or an historical balance sheet of rights and 
wrongs. Moreover, in these situations, participants will often read a prepared statement and 
leave the room when a different position is being defended. Occasionally, such participants 
will assert that they have not been consulted when, after all presentations have been 
concluded, their views are not adopted by decision-making body.
81. For a discussion of the experience of the LCC in relation to its project on Close Personal 
Adult Relationships where the initial focus of the project on examining all manner of adult 
relationship of dependence and interdependence became, under sustained lobbying from 
interest groups, increasingly directed to examining the question of “same sex marriage,” see 
RA Macdonald, “Perspectives on Personal Relationships” (Paper delivered at the Conference 
on Domestic Partnerships 21-23 October 1999) [unpublished].
82. See RA Macdonald, “All Law Reform is Local: Is Meaningful Law Reform Possible After 
NIMBY–DINKS (a.k.a. “Special Interest Groups”) Have Had Their Say?” (Paper delivered at the 
Law Commission of Ontario Conference, 13 May 2009) [unpublished].
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kids) draws attention to the fact that in almost every law reform proposal, those 
who have the resources to reshape the proposal to their benefit (or to minimize 
any negative impact it might have on their interests) are disproportionately able to 
influence the outcome.83
Even when a project is designed under a legal pluralist hypothesis, and regardless 
of whether the cause is progressive or regressive, inequality in the distribution of 
social and economic power means that organized special interests are usually able 
to defeat the diffused general interest. As the LCC discovered with its project on 
off-reserve Aboriginal governance, opportunistic, organized, self-interested lobbies 
can re-orient even the best-conceived social law reform agenda. Given that the 
legislative and judicial enterprise tends to reflect the existing distributions of social 
power, one important challenge of the new law reform is to discover when and how 
inherited conceptions of legal regulation implicitly marginalize or exclude groups 
of Canadians from processes of public deliberation, and to uncover measures to 
overcome their exclusion.84 That is the challenge John left us in the Final Report 
of the OLRC, and it remains a challenge to which participants in all sites of law 
reform are still imperfectly responding.
V. CONCLUSION
For John McCamus, the central aspiration of law reform must be to engage the 
general public in the process of reconceiving law to ensure that it is responsive, 
equally accessible, and just.85 Long before it became fashionable, John set about to 
organize institutional law reform so as to recognize the importance of unofficial, 
83. NIMBY-DINK domination of consultation processes arises because these groups are 
frequently able to aggregate their resources, focus their resentments, and enlist powerful 
supporters. The challenge for law commissions is to organize consultations to facilitate 
popular mobilization but at the same time ensure that all interests, and not just the most 
affluent, articulate and well-connected, are heard. To date it would seem that no law 
commission has explicitly investigated how to set the ground rules for popular participation 
so as to achieve these objectives. I owe this insight to Harry Arthurs.
84. It is a measure of the importance of this development of longer term, multidisciplinary, 
and pluralistic law reform that the LCO has published two outstanding framework reports, 
on persons with disabilities and on older adults that achieve exactly this objective. See Law 
Commission of Ontario, A Framework for the Law as It Affects Persons with Disabilities: 
Advancing Substantive Equality for Persons with Disabilities Through Law, Policy and Practice—
Final Report (Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 2012); Law Commission of Ontario, 
A Framework for the Law as It Affects Older Adults: Advancing Substantive Equality for Older 
Persons through Law, Policy and Practice (Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 2012).
85. This sentence is adapted from the Mission Statement of the now-defunct LCC, as set out in 
LCC, Strategic Agenda 1998, supra note 10 at 1.
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living law of everyday life in building a just and respectful society. John understood 
legal rules to be interwoven into and indistinguishable from the everyday 
activities of life and work, with those rules both shaping and being shaped by 
those activities. Human interaction is more than the encrustation of experiential 
barnacles upon official legal rules. This interaction, by giving form and context 
to debate about many of life’s most fundamental questions, powerfully symbolizes 
how citizens conceive their relationships with each other.
Unfortunately, however, such a view of the endeavour now seems out of 
favour with those who control the instruments of public governance. As ideology 
has progressively displaced evidence as a ground of policy development, the hope 
that law reform could appeal to an ideal of justice has faded. This change is largely 
attributable to a pair of false assumptions about the relative efficiency of different 
modes and sites of law reform. First, there is an assumption that law reform is 
speedier and less costly when executed through lobbies, litigation, and the courts 
than when it is developed through broad public consultations, the commissioning 
of expert studies, the collection of meaningful empirical evidence, and the 
investment of energy in political negotiation of workable legislative outcomes. 
The second assumption is that legal change should only move on a spur, as a 
response to sharply articulated revendications made by those with no generalized 
interest in law reform. When the law reform process is entirely responsive to 
political exigency, its outcomes rarely achieve better substantive law; they only 
reflect a different form of law.
Today, some of Canada’s most pressing social and economic problems 
do not lend themselves to legal resolution through orthodox research leading 
to legislative action. Appropriate policy responses require research into social, 
economic, and cultural contexts as well as into the full panoply of instruments 
available to facilitate cooperative action among governments and citizens. One of 
the principal critiques of first- and second-generation law reform commissions was 
the narrowness of their vision and their focus on modifying legal individual legal 
rules.86 Not surprisingly, when governments establish law reform commissions 
with an ends-driven mandate, these commissions typically respond by identifying 
success by reference to the extent that their proposals and recommendations are 
implemented—statutes passed, regulations modified, and even judicial overruling 
86. See JN Lyon, “Law Reform Needs Reform” (1974) 12:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 421; Macklin, 
supra note 26; HW Arthurs, “Social Issues and Law Reform–Research Program” 
[unpublished]; RA Samek, “The Objects and Limits of Law Reform” (Ottawa: Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, 1975).
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of precedents.87 Yet, if state action is to be the exclusive measure of success of 
law reform proposals, it is not obvious that an independent, expert agency is the 
optimal law reform vehicle. The policy development unit of a Department of 
Justice is much more likely to achieve implementation by advancing proposals that 
will meet the political objectives of the government of the day.
By contrast, those third-generation law commissions taking a legal pluralist 
approach aim foremost to tackle problems that do not immediately lend themselves 
to a statutory solution. They see their primary role as preparing the terrain for 
future legislation by increasing public understanding of various policy options and 
by lighting the pathway rather than paving the road.
Art critics speaking of the Group of Seven typically hold that the Group was 
not just painting the Canadian wilderness. The Group actually created a category 
of knowledge and understanding called the “Canadian wilderness.” Its paintings 
have taught us how to see that wilderness, how to interpret it, and how to live in 
harmony with it. In much the same way, jurists involved in law reform help us 
to see what law is and enrich our understanding of its promise and possibilities. 
Legal pluralist law reform is the exercise of engaging citizens in dialogue through 
which they gain richer insight into their normative lives and learn how to manage 
their everyday interaction with each other.
This is why a key mission of law reform agencies must be to improve processes 
of public consultation and engagement. It is to enhance the capacity of citizens 
to understand the real legal problem that needs to be addressed and to frame and 
reframe ways of giving effect to citizen understandings. In this respect, recasting the 
symbolic role that law plays in articulating the principles and processes of social 
justice is far more important than modifying any particular legal rule.
John’s Final Report of the OLRC captures that ambition. Let me paraphrase 
what I learned from it.88 Law is a precious societal resource. Sometimes, however, 
our reflexes about the forms and purposes of law are misdirected. The overuse 
of formal, state law is one such example. Because we instinctively respond to an 
issue by proclaiming, “There ought to be a law”, we tend not to ask what the real 
problem we face is and how it arises. Regrettably, our societal diagnostic skills 
often leave much to be desired. Even more regrettably, law reform agencies have 
87. For a defence of this tendency, see WH Hurlburt, “The Origins and Nature of Law Reform 
Commissions in the Canadian Provinces: A Reply to ‘Recommissioning Law Reform’ by 
Professor R.A. Macdonald” (1997) 35:4 Alta L Rev 880.
88. The message of the next two paragraphs is adapted from the third report of LCC, which 
shows the impact of John’s reflections about institutional law reform. See Law Commission 
of Canada, Annual Report 1999-2000 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government 
Services Canada, 2000) at 17.
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not fully exploited the capacity of law to educate, to incite debate, to guide, and 
to empower.
It is often said that education is too important to be left to professional 
educators alone. If that is so, we might derive the corollary that law reform is too 
important to be left solely to professional law reformers. In a liberal democracy, 
citizens are always the most important law reformers. In the end, the success of 
law depends on finding in personal interactions a framework of norms to nurture 
meaningful interpersonal relationships. These relationships develop through the 
interplay of social, cultural, religious and economic forces, which also shape 
how official law acknowledges them. In turn, official law plays back into the 
diverse social-cultural understandings that ground multiple regimes of everyday, 
unofficial law.
Only if we have a reasonably well thought-out idea of the aspirations of 
law reform can we recognize the limited, but special virtues of independent, 
expert law reform agencies. These virtues can be summarized in a single sentence: 
“Finding opportunities that allow Canadians to examine their assumptions about 
what they ask of their law, engaging in dialogues about where and why their 
expectations of law might be unrealistic, and involving them in the hard work of 
building more just official and unofficial legal systems is the true ambition of law 
reform—wherever and by whatever means it is actually carried out.”
Such a perspective is the guiding light for contemporary reform of “under 
the bed law,” and is the guiding motif behind “Law Reform for Dummies (3rd 
edition).” It is also how John McCamus understands law and law reform. It 
captures how he led the OLRC. And it informs every law reform endeavour, in 
every different site and through every different vehicle that he has pursued or 
deployed for more than forty years.
